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Abstract
Thanks to the phasing out of exemptions and excess itemized deductions and to the
alternative minimum tax, the federal income tax rate schedule is difficult to draw, to understand,
and to connect with any tax principle. Moreover, some taxpayers now face unreasonably high
marginal tax rates. This paper proposes a new approach that simplifies the income tax system at
its point of intersection with taxpayers; sets absolute upper and lower bounds on true marginal tax
rates; and allows for the phasing out of any or all exemptions, deductions, or other tax
preferences according to clear principles. This approach can achieve any desired degree of
progressivity.

Introduction
The current debate over income taxes sometimes takes on a surreal quality, as people
discuss a tax schedule that has little to do with the schedule taxpayers actually face. Thanks to
the phasing out of exemptions and excess itemized deductions and to the alternative minimum tax,
the current tax rate schedule is difficult to draw, difficult to understand, and difficult to connect
with any tax principle. Moreover, some taxpayers face marginal tax rates that are far above the
rates mentioned in the public debate. A flat tax could solve these problems, but only if it
eliminated so many tax preferences that it could avoid the temptation to include phase-outs or an
alternative minimum tax. This paper proposes a new approach to income tax structure that
simplifies the tax system at its point of intersection with taxpayers; sets absolute upper and lower
bounds on true marginal tax rates; and allows for the phasing out of any or all exemptions,
deductions, and tax preferences according to clear principles.
The paper begins by discussing the logic of phase-outs. The second section presents some
of the issues that arise with tax simplification. A new type of income tax structure, based on a
continuous tax schedule, is presented in section three. This structure is extended to facilitate the
phasing out of tax preferences, including those covered by the alternative minimum tax. This
section also presents the implications of this tax schedule for the simplicity of income tax forms.
This paper does not simulate the minimum and maximum marginal tax rates, and other tax
parameters, that would be possible with this new income tax structure, holding revenue constant.
However, the author plans to conduct such an exercise in the near future.

The Logic of Phase-Outs and the Alternative Minimum Tax
Phase-out provisions and the alternative minimum tax are built on the principle that the
need to differentiate across taxpayers diminishes as income increases. Many provisions in the tax

code are designed to lower the burden of taxation for taxpayers who face certain circumstances,
such as a large family or high medical bills. The need to protect these taxpayers is not compelling
when their income is very high. As Pechman (1987, p. 84) puts it in the case of exemptions, “A
vanishing exemption is supported on the ground that exemptions are not justified for persons with
very large incomes, since at these levels they are not needed to meet essential consumption
requirements for the taxpayers and their children.” A similar argument is typically stated to justify
the alternative minimum tax, originally called the minimum tax, which “was introduced in 1969 in
an attempt to obtain some tax contribution from wealthy people who had previously escaped
income taxation on all or most of their income” (Pechman 1987, p. 128).
Because all these provisions raise the average tax rate of affected taxpayers, they also
make it possible either to raise tax revenue or to raise the same amount of revenue with a lower
tax rate schedule for other taxpayers. The fairness principle behind phase-outs, that the need to
distinguish across taxpayers diminishes as income goes up, therefore supports a redistribution of
the tax burden away from taxpayers in general and toward high-income taxpayers affected by
provisions such as the exemptions phase-out or the alternative minimum tax.
The phasing out of personal exemptions, which began in 1986, and of excess itemized
deductions, which began a few years later, are often sold as a way to raise more revenue without
altering the schedule of marginal tax rates. One commentator (Thomas 1995, p. 1689), recently
emphasized this illusion: “Many phaseouts...are gimmicky ways of raising taxes without
appearing to raise rates.”1 Although many observers pointed out that the exemption phase-out in
the 1986 Tax Reform Act created a 33 percent bracket and a few scholars have discussed the
general impact of tax provisions on marginal tax rates (see, for example, Steuerle 1995), neither
the tax tables printed in the instruction booklets prepared by the Internal Revenue Service nor the
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tax schedules emphasized in most public debates today are altered to reflect these phase-outs. In
fact, however, a phase-out is entirely equivalent to a change in the marginal tax schedule for a
person whose return includes the item being phased out.
To see why this is true, consider the following highly simplified tax system with two tax
brackets and a personal exemption that phases out starting at the bottom of the higher tax
bracket. In symbols, G is gross income, E is the personal exemption, Y / G - E is taxable income,
and T is the tax payment. The tax schedule is
T ' t1 Y
' t1 Y1 % t2 ( Y & Y1 )

if Y # Y1
(1)
if Y1 < Y ,

where t1 and t2 are the two tax rates and Y1 is the boundary between the two tax brackets. Now
suppose the exemption is phased out starting when G minus the starting exemption, E0, equals Y1,
or
E ' E0

if G # G1 / Y1 % E0
if G1 < G < G1 %

' 0

if G $ G1 %

E0

' E0 & p( G & G1 )

E0
p

(2)

p
,

where p is the rate at which the exemption is phased out. Combining (1) and (2), we find that this
tax system is equivalent to the following four bracket system applied to G:
if G # E0

T ' 0
' t1 ( G & E 0 )

if E0 < G # G1

' t1 ( G & E0 ) % t2 ( 1 % p ) ( G & G1 )

if G1 < G < G %

' t1 ( G & E0 ) % t2 [ G & ( G1 & E0 ) ]

if G $ G1 %
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E0
p

E0
p
.

(3)

Thus, the tax schedule with an exemption phase-out is equivalent to a tax schedule with no phaseout in which the marginal rate goes from t1 to t2(1+p) and then back down to t2.2
This analysis proves the following theorem: Phase-outs of exemptions, excess itemized
deductions, or other tax preferences are nothing more and nothing less than alterations in the
marginal tax rate schedule for taxpayers with that item on their return. This equivalence theorem
shifts the focus of discussion on phase-outs back to the marginal tax rate schedule where it
belongs. Phase-outs should be designed so that they have sensible effects on marginal tax rates.
Moreover, taxpayers should be informed about these effects, not misled by a discussion limited to
the incomplete tax schedules printed in the IRS instruction booklets.
The problem, of course, is that the current phase-out provisions have different implications
for the marginal rate schedules of different taxpayers so that their impacts on marginal tax rates
are difficult to explain. Illustrative true marginal tax rate schedules for taxpayers with specified
characteristics could be drawn, but there is no way to provide complete marginal tax rate
information for everyone. In contrast, the tax system presented below preserves phase-outs and
provides complete information on the marginal tax rate faced by every taxpayer.
Another provision that affects marginal tax rates is the alternative minimum tax. The
latest version adds many preference items back to taxable income and taxes the resulting
“alternative minimum taxable income” above an exemption amount with a two bracket schedule
that has marginal rates of 26 and 28 percent. Because it eliminates the 15 percent bracket, this
schedule boosts the average tax rate of taxpayers with many preference items, and may even
boost their marginal rate if these items reduced their regular taxable income so much that they
would otherwise fall into the 15 percent bracket. In a final complicating twist, the exemption in
the alternative minimum tax is phased out at a rate of 25 percent for taxpayers with alternative
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minimum taxable income above $150,000 (for joint returns), thereby creating a middle bracket
with a marginal rate of .26(1+.25) = 32.5 percent. This rate exceeds the 31 percent marginal rate
that some of these taxpayers would face without the alternative minimum tax.
In short, the alternative minimum tax succeeds in its objective of raising the average tax
rates of high income taxpayers with extensive tax preferences, but it results in a haphazard
marginal tax rate schedule, with higher marginal rates for some taxpayers and lower marginal
rates for others. The tax schedule presented below preserves this effect on average tax rates
without such bizarre implications for the tax due on an additional dollar of income.

Tax Simplification
As several scholars have pointed out, tax simplification is a complicated phenomenon. A
thoughtful discussion of the topic in Bradford (1986, pp. 266-267), identifies three types of tax
complexity. Compliance complexity refers “to the problems faced by the taxpayer in keeping
records, choosing forms, making necessary calculations, and so on.” Transactional complexity
refers “to the problems facing taxpayers in organizing their affairs so as to minimize their taxes
within the framework of the rules.” And rule complexity refers “to the problems of interpreting
the written and unwritten rules.” Bradford also points out that steps to lower one type of
complexity may increase another type, and that any change in the tax system may decrease
complexity for some taxpayers and increase it for others.
The phasing out of exemptions and excess itemized deductions and the alternative
minimum tax result in a significant increase in computational complexity for many taxpayers.
These provisions involve extra worksheets in one of the tax instructions booklets, complicated
forms to fill out, or both. Moreover, every taxpayers must fill in another worksheet to determine
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whether she is required to complete the forms for the alternative minimum tax, and many
taxpayers who do not have to pay the alternative minimum tax, including many taxpayers who
claim a child care credit, must fill out the associated forms. Indeed, this type of complexity now
seems to pervade the income tax, as the number of worksheets in the main instructions booklet for
the 1040 form has increased from one in 1977 (for the earned income tax credit) to eighteen in
1995. All this complexity adds considerably to the compliance costs faced by taxpayers.3
Much of the recent discussion about tax simplification has focused on proposals for a socalled flat tax. See Slemrod (1995). Proponents claim that flat taxes promote simplicity by (1)
eliminating the progressive rate structure and (2) eliminating tax preferences. Eliminating
progressive rates is said to reduce both compliance and transactional complexity. It is not clear,
however, that a flat rate would simplify tax compliance. As Bradford (1986, p. 276) puts it “Once
the taxpayer has calculated his taxable income, it is a simple matter to determine tax liability.
True, multiplication by a single rate, the same for all, would be the simplest of all calculations.
But looking the tax up in a table is a close second.” I would go a step farther. Looking the tax
up in a table probably is easier that multiplying for most taxpayers because it does not involve
either a calculator or a pencil and paper.
In contrast, reductions in transactional complexity might occur with a single rate as
taxpayers would no longer have incentives to rearrange their income, across time or across
sources, in order to fall into a lower bracket. Although such gains are difficult to calculate, they
might be substantial.
The issue, of course, is that these simplicity gains require the elimination of progressivity
in the marginal tax rate schedule. The long tradition of a progressive marginal tax schedule in the
United States indicate that taxpayers prefer at least a modest degree of progressivity.4 This type
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of preference cannot be satisfied with a flat tax. This paper does not attempt to determine whether
progressivity is desirable, but instead provides an alternative to the flat tax that also provides
reductions in transactional complexity while retaining progressivity.
The second claim about a flat tax has more merit in principle, but it is not so clear whether
it does in practice. Abolishing all tax preferences would certainly simplify the tax system in the
long run, but it would cause enormous adjustment in the short run, and such a dramatic change
might not be feasible. For both broad substantive reasons and narrow political ones, exemptions,
deductions, and other tax preferences are likely to appear, even in a flat tax. The Tax Reform Act
of 1986, for example, eliminated many tax preference items, but quite a few of them, along with
some new ones, have crept back into the tax code since then (see, for example, Slemrod 1992).
Personal exemptions and some itemized deductions, such as those for homeowners and for
charitable contributions, are popular and would be difficult to eliminate. Moreover, if personal
exemptions and itemized deductions remain in the tax code, there will be a temptation for policy
makers to phase them out above some income level so that the supposedly flat rate can be
lowered. Of course, such a step would create income segments in which the marginal rate was
above the single rate in the official schedule.
The tax system proposed below is designed primarily to reduce what Bradford calls
compliance complexity in a tax system that retains exemptions, itemized deductions, and other tax
preferences. It also would reduce transactional complexity to some degree by lowering a
taxpayer’s options for reallocating income to reduce taxes. Unlike a flat tax, however, it would
not eliminate these options entirely. This simplification is achieved at some cost in terms of rules
complexity, as the new system is more difficult to describe than the current one, at least formally.
Indeed, many readers will no doubt chuckle at my claim that this new tax system represents a
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simplification. However, I claim only that this system is simple at the point of intersection with
taxpayers, not in any absolute sense. The point of intersection with taxpayers cannot be described
until the end of the discussion, so I ask the reader not to pass judgement until that point is
reached. Moreover, even though the formal description of this system is more complex than we
are used to, the principles involved are straightforward and easy to understand.

A New Approach to Income Tax Structure
This section builds on four tax principles to design a new tax structure that avoids the
problems identified earlier in this paper. After the principles are presented and the tax system
described, the implications of the new tax system for income tax forms, and hence for the
computational simplicity, are explored.
Four Principles of Income Tax Structure Design
The first principle is that the marginal tax rate schedule should be progressive. Many
discussions of progressivity focus on average rates, not marginal rates. For example, the optimal
tax literature (reviewed in Stiglitz 1987) relies on a utilitarian social welfare function that gives
negative weight to dispersion in utilities across households, but gives no weight whatsoever to the
fairness of the tax structure as such. With this approach, distributional objectives can be achieved
with a demigrant to all households and a progressive marginal tax rate structure is not necessary.
In fact, some authors, including Slemrod, Yitzhaki, and Mayshar (1991), find that a regressive
marginal tax rate structure combined with a demigrant produces the progressivity in average tax
rates needed to meet equity objectives and the work incentives needed to promote efficiency.
Although demigrants are not available in the U.S. income tax (and it seems unlikely that they will
be added), exemptions and deductions serve a similar purpose.5 By ensuring that people with
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gross incomes below some level will pay no income tax, they ensure that the average tax rate,
taxes divided by gross income, will increase with gross income even if the marginal rate structure
is flat or even somewhat regressive.
Progressivity in the marginal tax rate structure is emphasized here for two reasons. First,
along with the income level below which no tax is due, the marginal tax rate schedule is the best
known and most accessible piece of information about the progressivity of the tax system. Voters
can easily observe progressivity in this rate schedule and make judgements about its fairness.
Average tax rate schedules for various types of taxpayers could in principle be provided to voters,
but they are more complicated to explain than marginal tax rate schedules. Second, one can
legitimately be concerned about fairness in the tax due on an additional dollar of income. People
who have a lot of income, and hence have already covered their basic needs, may not seem to be
making as large a sacrifice in paying a t percent tax rate on an additional dollar of income as are
people who have little money. Hence, a flat or declining marginal tax rate schedule may not
appear to equalize sacrifice across taxpayers and may be seen as unfair.6
This discussion does not, of course, indicate the optimal degree of progressivity, or even if
progressivity is desirable once other objectives, such as efficiency, are considered. Moreover, this
paper makes no attempt to resolve these issues, which are discussed in detail elsewhere (see, for
example, Bradford 1986). Instead, this paper builds on the notion that progressivity in the
marginal tax rate structure is a legitimate fairness concern and designs a tax system in which such
progressivity—along with more simplicity—is assured.
One way to meet this principle is to use a continuous tax table, instead of the usual
discrete tax table, governed by the following equation for the marginal tax rate:
TN /

dT
' t0 % t1 s( Y) ,
dY

(4)
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where T is tax payment, Y is taxable income, t0 and t1 are policy parameters, and s(Y) is a
monotonic function that reaches a value of unity when Y equals infinity. For example, if s(0) = 0
and s(4) = 1, the marginal tax rate equals t0 for the first dollar of taxable income, and approaches
(t0 + t1) when taxable income is very large. A taxpayer’s tax payment obviously is the integral of
its marginal tax function, or
Y

T '

m
0

Y

d T ' t0 Y % t1

m

s ( Y N ) dY N .

(5)

0

The second principle is that the marginal tax rate should increase relatively slowly at low
values of Y, so that extra effort by the poorest taxpayers does not result in a significant increase in
their marginal tax rate. This principle is in keeping with the longstanding tradition in the United
States income tax to set a reasonably wide bottom tax bracket. In 1995, for example, the lowest
marginal tax rate, 15 percent, applied to taxable incomes (on joint returns) between zero and
$39,000. In the context of (4), this principle says that the s(Y) function should not have a steep
positive slope at low values of Y, so that it preserves a bottom bracket, at least in spirit.
The third and fourth principles involve the treatment of tax preferences. So far the
discussion has involved only taxable income, Y, which is found by subtracting exclusions,
exemptions, and deductions, and from gross income. (In the income tax code, of course,
exclusions, also called adjustments, are subtracted from gross income to form adjusted gross
income, or AGI.) As the term is used here, tax preferences are exclusions, exemptions, or
deductions that are classified as ones that should be phased out when income get sufficiently
high.7 This differs from standard usage, in which tax preferences are tax items that receive special
treatment, but need not be phased out. The alternative minimum tax and the phase-out of both
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exemptions and excess itemized deductions are examples of current policies consistent with this
new definition of preferences.
With this background, the final two principles can now be stated. The third principle is
that the phasing out of tax preferences should not fundamentally alter the tax schedule either by
generating marginal tax rates that exceed the maximum rate (as defined by (4), for example) or by
causing spikes, or, more technically, local maxima, in the tax rate schedule. This principle is
designed to ensure that marginal tax schedules mean what they say, without any hidden global or
local maximums that appear only under unusual circumstances, and that violations of the
progressive marginal rate schedule are not hidden in special provisions. No politician should be
able to trumpet an official tax schedule that hides large jumps in marginal tax rates in certain
income ranges and no taxpayer should encounter a situation in which unusual circumstances,
such as phase-outs of various exemptions or deductions, result in marginal tax rates that are far
above the official ones. As shown earlier, current phase-out provisions clearly do not satisfy
either part of this principle.
The fourth principle is that any phasing out of tax preferences should have a larger impact
on higher-income taxpayers. This principle states what appears to be implicit in both the
alternative minimum tax and various phase-out provisions: There should be limits on the extent to
which high-income people can reduce their taxes through tax preferences, and the higher the
income, the greater these limits should be. The current phase-out provisions for personal
exemptions and excess itemized deductions, for example, have implications for average tax rates
that are consistent with this principle; the phase-outs do not begin until incomes are fairly high and
they raise average tax rates monotonically above that point. However, the impacts of these
provisions on marginal tax rates clearly violate this principle; marginal tax rates jump up in the
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phase-out range of income and then drop back down to the official schedule for incomes above
this range.8
Tax Schedules that Satisfy the First Two Principles
One form for the s(Y) function that satisfies the first two principles is the logistic form.9
This form, which is well known from its use in econometrics is
s( Y) '

1
1 % e &(( Y & Y

(

.

(6)

)

With this form in (4), the marginal tax rate schedule becomes
1

T N ' t0 % t1

1 % e &(( Y & Y

(

.

(7)

)

This tax schedule, which has two policy parameters, ( and Y*, is illustrated in Figure 1.
The marginal tax rate is slightly above t0 when Y = 0 and reaches a maximum of (t0 + t1) when Y =
4. The Y* parameter determines the taxable income at which s(Y) = 0.5. In other words, it
determines the taxable income at which the marginal tax rate falls half way between t0 and (t0 + t1).
The ( parameter determines the extent to which the marginal rate exceeds t0 when Y = 0.
In fact, this parameter can be derived for any given deviation between the initial marginal tax rate
and t0. If * is the desired deviation, then the value of ( must be set so that TN(0) = t0 + *.
Evaluating (7) at Y = 0, the appropriate value of ( can be shown to be

ln
( '

t1
*

& 1

Y(

(8)

.

Selecting ( (or *) involves a trade-off between the flatness of the tax schedule at low incomes and
the steepness of the tax schedule around Y*. A large value of ( (or a small value of *) implies
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that the tax schedule is very flat at low values of Y but very steep around Y*. To put it another
way, one can create a wide bottom “bracket” by setting ( very high, but only at the expense of a
marginal tax rate that increases very rapidly in the middle of the income range. In fact, as (
approaches infinity, the tax schedule approaches a two-rate schedule with a rate of t0 for incomes
up to Y* and a rate of (t0 + t1) for incomes above Y*. By contrast, the tax schedule approaches a
single rate of [t0 + (0.5)t1] as ( approaches zero.
Figure 1 sets t0 = 0.15, t1 = 0.25, Y* = $100,000, and * = .0001. The role of * (or () is
illustrated in Figure 2, which includes another tax schedule based on the same parameter values
except that * is raised to 0.01. This change in * has a dramatic impact on the length of the first
tax “bracket.” With * = .0001, the marginal tax rate does not increase by one percentage point
over its value at Y = 0 until Y reaches $50,400, whereas with * = .01 it has increased by one
percentage point when Y reaches only $13,600.
Combining (5) and (7), we find that tax payments with this logistic form are given by
T ' ( t0 % t1 ) Y %

t1
(

ln 1 % e &(( Y & Y

(

)

& ln 1 % e ( Y

(

.

(9)

Although this formula may appear complex, it can easily be translated into a tax table, so that
none of the complexity is visible to taxpayers.
Phase-Outs to Meet the Second Two Principles
Let us now turn to tax preferences, P, as defined earlier. For a person with income Y, the
value of tax preferences is approximately equal to P[TN(Y)]. With a continuous tax schedule, this
expression is only an approximation, because each additional dollar of P offsets income that
would be taxed at a slightly higher marginal tax rate than the previous dollar of income.
However, this expression favors the taxpayer, since it understates the value of preferences, and an

-13-

exact expression would add little except complexity.10 Using this expression, the question
becomes: How can the savings from tax preferences be phased out as income increases?
To be consistent with the third and fourth principles, any treatment of tax preferences
must not change the general form of the tax schedule and must ensure that phase-outs have a
larger impact on higher-income taxpayers. One way to do this is to shift the marginal tax rate
schedule in response to preferences in a way that phases out tax preferences completely for
taxpayers whose incomes are so high that they face the maximum marginal tax rate. Because the
tax payment, T, equals the area under the marginal tax rate schedule, this approach requires
defining another marginal tax rate schedule the area under which is larger than the original one by
the value of tax preferences.
In more formal terms, let us define an amount, Ŷ , which, when added to income, would
ensure that the tax savings due to a person’s tax preferences would be completely eliminated if
their income increased to infinity. This is obviously an abstract concept, as no person’s income
can be expected to increase to infinity (!), but it captures the spirit of the third principle because it
defines the simple shift in the tax schedule that we are looking for. This shift is illustrated in
Figure 3, where Ŷ is the value that sets the area between the two tax schedules, one based on Y
and the other based on (Y + Ŷ ), equal to P[TN(Y)], the value of tax preferences.11 The expression
(Y + Ŷ ) will be called adjusted taxable income.
Moreover, this approach is consistent with the fourth principle, because the share of the
benefits from tax preferences that a taxpayer loses, the doubly shaded area in Figure 3, increases
with income. A taxpayer with no taxable income gets to keep virtually all of the benefits of her
tax preferences, whereas a taxpayer with an income that places her near the flat part of the
original tax schedule, gets to keep virtually none of these benefits. In addition, this approach
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strengthens the version of this principle implicit in the alternative minimum tax, namely that highincome taxpayers should not be able to use tax loopholes to dramatically cut their taxes, let alone
to avoid taxes altogether. Indeed, if the list of tax preferences is comprehensive, this tax system
makes it impossible for very-high-income taxpayers to gain from loopholes at all.
Formally, the value of Ŷ can be found from the following equation:
T ( 4 % Ŷ ) & T ( 4) ' P [ T N ( Y ) ]

.

(10)

Substituting in (9) and solving for Ŷ , we find that
Ŷ '

P [ T N ( Y) ]
t0 % t1

.

(11)

When income is high enough for the marginal tax rate to equal (t0 + t1), Yˆ obviously equals P, and
the full amount of the tax preferences that were subtracted to form taxable income are added back
to form adjusted taxable income. When Y = 0, the marginal tax rate equals t0 + *, so Ŷ is only a
small fraction of P. With a very small *, this fraction is approximately equal to t0/(t0 + t1).12
Because this approach eliminates the benefits from tax preferences for very-high-income
taxpayers, it also eliminates the incentives for them to shift toward activities that receive tax
preferences, and thereby reduces the transactional complexity of the tax system. If some such
activities, such as charitable giving, are deemed to have social value, then they can be excluded, in
whole or in part, from the list of tax preferences. If, for example, only half of charitable
contributions were considered a tax preference, then a very-high-income taxpayer could save (t0 +
t1)/2 dollars for every dollar she gave to a charity.
With this approach, policy makers do not have independent control over the phase-out
rates for tax preferences. All preferences are phased out according to the same rate schedule, and
this schedule is determined by the policy parameters of the marginal tax rate schedule, equation
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(7). To be specific, the type of phase-out included in current law is the percentage decline in
exemptions (or in excess itemized deductions) when income increases one dollar. In the system
considered here, the analog to the exemption (or deduction) is the amount by which one dollar of
tax preferences (which could include exemptions and excess itemized deductions) lowers adjusted
taxable income, (Y + Ŷ ). The phase-out rate is the decline in this amount that accompanies a one
dollar increase in income. Simple differentiation reveals that this phase-out rate equals
TO(Y)/(t0+t1), where TO is the derivative of the marginal tax schedule.13
Thus, as shown in Figure 4, the phase-out rate reaches a maximum at Y*, where the
marginal tax rate schedule is steepest.14 Because TO is symmetrical, this implies that preferences
are half-way phased out by the time income reaches Y*.15 This result adds intuitive appeal to this
form of phase-out; in selecting Y*, policy makers determine where both marginal tax rates and a
voters tax preferences are half way between their minimum and maximum values. Similarly, when
policy makers set ( (or *), they are not only determining the relative steepness of the marginal tax
rate schedule at Y* and in the lowest “bracket,” they also are determining the phase-out rate for P
at Y* relative to the phase-out rate in the lowest “bracket.” A higher value for ( (or a lower value
for *) implies both a relatively steep marginal tax rate schedule and relatively high phase-out rate
at Y*. Even with a very high value for (, however, the phase-out rate remains miniscule at any
given income level because the phasing out of preferences occurs gradually over the entire income
range.
One also can calculate the rate at which tax benefits from preferences phase out. In the
current tax system, the phasing out of tax benefits has two components. First, an increase in
income that shifts a taxpayer into a higher tax bracket increases the tax savings from another
dollar of preferences. This change is equivalent to a negative phase-out rate for tax benefits. This
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negative rate reflects, of course, the regressive nature of exemptions and deductions, which give a
larger tax break to taxpayers in higher income brackets. Second, a formal x percent phase-out
rate for exemptions (or some other tax preference) in a certain income range results in a tx percent
phase-out in the tax savings from exemptions, where t is the individual’s marginal tax rate in that
range.
In the approach presented here, the tax benefit from one dollar of preferences is the
derivative of T(Y + Ŷ ) with respect to P, and the phase-out of this benefit is its derivative with
respect to Y. This expression depends on P and is presented for several different value of P in
Figure 4.16 This phase-out rate reflects the same two factors that appear in the current tax system,
namely the increasing marginal tax rate as income increases, which raises the tax savings from
preferences, and the phasing out of preferences as income increases. At low incomes and all but
the highest values of P, the first factor dominates and the phase-out rate actually is slightly
negative. For all values of P, however, this phase-out rate eventually becomes positive and
reaches a maximum at or just above Y*. Above this maximum (or at any value of Y when P is
very large), the phase-out rate schedule equals TO(Y). Thus, the tax system proposed here does
not entirely eliminate the regressivity of exemptions and deducations, but it does confine this
regressivity to a relatively narrow income range.
In short, the phase-out rate schedule for the tax savings from preferences is similar in
shape to the phase-out rate schedule for P, except that it involves a small negative phase-out rate
at low levels of income (and with all but the highest values of P). Unlike the negative phase-out
rates in the current system, the negative rates in this system are small and spread out, not
concentrated at income-bracket boundaries. The parameters of the marginal tax rate schedule are
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reflected in this phase-out rate schedule, which reaches a maximum at or just above Y* at a level
that increases with the value of (.
The Simplicity Punch Line: Tax Forms with a Continuous Tax Schedule
Public officials could implement this tax system by identifying the set of tax preferences
and setting four intuitive policy parameters:

• The minimum marginal tax rate, t0
• The distance between the maximum and minimum marginal tax rates, t1
• The income at which the marginal rate is half way between the minimum and maximum,
Y*
• The parameter determining the width of the bottom “bracket,” *.

These parameters give policy makers considerable flexibility in setting up this tax system.
For example, they could recognize the trade-off identified in the optimal tax literature: Efforts to
increase progressivity (by increasing the difference between t0 and t1, for example) may have some
cost in terms of lost efficiency.17 Moreover, the more existing exclusions, exemptions, and
deductions that are classified as preferences (as the term is used here), the lower the tax rates can
be set, all else equal, and the lower the overall efficiency loss from the income tax. With t0 set at
the current minimum marginal tax rate, 15 percent, for example, classifying more tax items as tax
preferences would make it possible to lower the maximum marginal tax rate, t1.
Calculations by a taxpayer involve familiar concepts with the exception of Ŷ . To calculate
Ŷ , a taxpayer needs to (a) add up all items defined as tax preferences and (b) find out her
marginal tax rate, TN(Y). Preferences could be added up on a single tax form and marginal tax
rates could be included in the standard tax table (or a separate marginal rate table organized the
same way). Once Ŷ has been calculated, the taxpayer’s final tax comes from the standard tax
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table at a value of (Y + Ŷ ), which is adjusted taxable income. Moreover, each taxpayer’s true
marginal tax rate is the entry for this adjusted taxable income in the marginal tax rate table.
The required tax calculations are illustrated in Table 1, which presents the lines on a the
back of a hypothetical 1040 form for the tax system described here. The ten lines in this table
(plus the form adding up preferences) replace all the phase-out worksheets and the alternative
minimum tax forms in the current income tax and therefore represent a significant degree of
simplification at the point of interaction between the taxpayer and the tax system.
With many values of the minimum and maximum tax rates,t0 and t1, particularly when
they differ significantly, the adjustment to taxable income, that is, the value ofŶ , is very small
when taxable income is small. Further simplification therefore could be achieved by skipping this
adjustment for low-income taxpayers.18 Alternatively, the list of preferences could exclude
personal exemptions and the standard deduction, so that virtually all low-income taxpayers would
not have anything defined as a tax preference. This second approach would be simpler, but it
would require higher tax rates to obtain the same revenue as the first approach.
This tax system can easily accommodate both the distinction between separate and joint
returns and indexing. Both of these adjustments involve the setting of Y*. Doubling Y* doubles
the income at which the tax rate half way between the minimum and maximum is reached and is
therefore analogous to doubling the width of the tax brackets. It follows that the value of Y*
should be twice as high for joint as for separate or single returns. Moreover, to keep this half-way
rate at the same real income, Y* could be indexed, that is, multiplied every year by a consumer
price index.
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Conclusions
Many policy makers emphasize the need to bring down marginal tax rates, particularly at
the top of the income distribution, but then, in an effort to attain revenue targets, employ policy
tools that keep marginal tax rates high for many high-income taxpayers. This paper provides a
way out this dilemma. In particular, it devises a new type of income tax structure that, following
several clear tax principles, eliminates spikes in the marginal rate structure while at the same time
greatly simplifying income tax returns for many taxpayers, particularly those affected by phaseouts or the alternative minimum tax. This approach is flexible in the sense that it can be calibrated
to achieve any desired degree of progressivity and can accommodate any set of tax preferences.
In future work I hope to use a sample of individual income tax returns to simulate the marginal
tax rate schedules that would be possible with this system for a variety of progressivity targets and
tax preferences, holding total tax revenue constant.
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Endnotes
1.

Thomas also points out that “whatever benefit we are trying to recapture from higherincome taxpayers can be recaptured in a much simpler, fairer, and more honest way: by
building recapture into the rate structure.” This is, as we will see, the objective of this
paper! However, Thomas goes on to say that recapture should be built into the rate
structure that everyone faces. “No harm is done if a wealthy person with many
dependents retains some of the benefit of his or her exemption.” As pointed out earlier,
the issue is not one of “harm” but is instead that the case for exemptions and tax
preferences weakens as income rises. It is fairer, therefore, to recapture more from
higher-income people with more tax preferences. Policy makers who reject this fairness
argument should support the Thomas approach!

2.

In fact, the schedule defined by (1) and (2) is equivalent to an infinite number of other
schedules with different combinations of marginal tax rates and exemptions. For example,
it is equivalent to one applied to G with the same brackets as in (3) in which the four rates
are 0, t1G1/(G1+E0), t2(1+p), and t2, and the exemption is phased out for values of G above
E0 at a rate of r = E0/G1.

3.

Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992) estimate that the average taxpayer spent 27.4 hours
preparing income tax returns in 1989, compared to 21.7 hours in 1982. See also Slemrod
(1992).

4.

Survey evidence summarized in Sheffrin (1993) indicates that taxpayers prefer a high
degree of progressivity in average tax rates, which would be difficult to achieve with a flat
tax, at least at relatively high income levels.

5.

The earned income tax credit does not serve as a demigrant because it equals zero when
income is zero.

6.

Many economists have developed theories of sacrifice or marginal sacrifice, often based
on the declining marginal utility of income, to derive the right degree of tax progressivity.
My interpretation of this literature coincides with Bradford’s (1986, p. 153): “Such
abstract principles should be regarded not as externally imposed criteria for policy but as
ways of describing commonly held values about the effects of policy.”

7.

Doug Holtz-Eakin has pointed out to me that the set of tax items that qualify to be
preferences under this definition depends on the definition of the tax base. For example,
interest on municipal bonds, which receives a special tax exemption in the current income
tax, is a clear example of a potential tax preference, and indeed interest earned on private
activity municipal bonds is covered by the alternative minimum tax. With a consumption
tax base, however, investment items are not taxed so municipal bond interest could not be
considered a tax preferences. The approach presented in this paper could be applied to
any base definition and to any relevant set of tax preferences.
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8.

As Thomas (1995, p. 1689) puts it phaseouts “make a dubious contribution to the fairness
of the Internal Revenue Code.”

9.

Another function that satisfies these two principles is the hyperbolic tangent, which ranges
from negative one to positive one. Remarkably, with the same values for the minimum
and maximum tax rates, for the income at which the half-way rate is reached, and for *,
the marginal tax rate schedules generated by these two functions are identical.

10.

Another approach that improves the approximation and is only somewhat more complex is
to replace TN(Y) with the average of TN(Y) and TN(Y + P).

11.

In Figure 3, the value of P is set at $50,000.

12.

Moreover, the tax paid because of this adjustment is approximately equal to P(t0)2/(t0 + t1).
With t0 = .15 and t1 = .25, for example, this extra tax is only (0.05625)P.

13.

To derive this result, note that d(Y + Ŷ )/dP = -1 + TN(Y)/(t0+t1). The derivative of this
expression with respect to Y is simply TO(Y)/(t0+t1).

14.

Figure 4 is based on the same values of the tax parameters as is Figure 1.

15.

To be precise, it is not quite symmetrical because it is cut off at Y = 0. With a small value
for *, however, it is very close to symmetrical. Note that the area under this phase-out
curve equals unity; the cumulative phase-out rate for $1 of P must equal $1.

16.

The expression: (d/dY)(d/dP)[T(Y + Ŷ )] = TO(Y + Ŷ )[1+PTO(Y)/t*)][TN(Y)/t*-1] + TN(Y
+ Ŷ )TO(Y)/t*, where t* = t0+t1. As either P or Y becomes very large, this expression
reduces to TO(Y).

17.

This efficiency loss arises because under most assumptions a given tax rate causes a larger
behavioral distortion and a larger utility loss for higher-income taxpayers. See Stiglitz
(1987) and Slemrod, Yitzhaki, and Mayshar (1991).

18.

This approach actually results in a small discrete upward jump in the marginal tax rate
when the income exceeds the level at which a taxpayer is exempt from the phase-out
provision. One could call this a minor violation of the second principle in the name of
practicality.
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Table 1.

Tax Calculations for a Continuous Income Tax Schedule

Line 32: Adjusted Gross Income
Line 33: Personal Exemptions
Line 34: Income Less Exemptions (Line 32 less Line 33)
Line 35: Deductions (Standard or Itemized)
Line 36: Taxable Income (Line 34 less Line 35)
If tax preferences equal zero (or are less than some selected value), enter this amount on Line 40, and
skip Lines 37 to 39.
Line 37: Marginal Tax Rate (From Table)
Line 38: Preferences (From Preferences Form)
Line 39: Income Adjustment (Line 37 multiplied by Line 38, then divided by (t0 + t1))
Line 40: Adjusted Taxable Income (Line 36 plus Line 39)
Line 41: Tax on Adjusted Taxable Income (From Table)
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Figure 1.

The Marginal Tax Rate Schedule
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Figure 2.

Impact of * on the Tax Schedule
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Figure 3.

Phasing Out Tax Preferences
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Figure 4.

Phase-Out Rates
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